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ABSTRACT 
Unequal social relations and domination by individuals and 
groupings in a society can be created and maintained by violence. 
But this generally is inadequate for the legitimation of that 
situation or for the acquiescence of those less privileged; the 
maintenance of the inequality is effected by language, by devaluing 
the subjugated's language and by using language to create the 
impression of the legitimacy of the unequal relations. This study 
aims to explore some aspects of how language and specifically 
speech acts are structured to create unequal social relations and 
link this to discourse practices that maintain this inequality. 
Language is, however, not an inflexible medium; as it can be used 
to shape the subjugated's consciousness to regard the inequality as 
normal, it can also form and reflect a resistance consciousness. 
Language and power mesh in many ways. Chapter one will deal 
generally with issues of language and power relations in society. 
This dissertation hopes to focus on how ideology and power are 
present in and structured into utterances. Chapter two will show 
that the speech act theory can be extended to include ideological 
force or intent as part of a speech act. This intent is structured 
in the details of the utterance; and that will be the area of 
chapter three, which reviews the "critical linguistics" thinking 
around discourse analysis of manipulative intent; and the last 
chapter will focus on how language can be a means of resisting 
social domination and creating true consensus. 
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V I 
INTRODUCTION 
1 .General 
Al i Mazrui recounts his experience of having his Swahili tested at 
gunpoint to prove that he was not a supporter of the deposed 
Bugandan leader who had marked his resistance to amalgamation into 
the East African community by insisting that his supporters refuse 
to learn Swahili: 
A linguistic test was now being used as 
a way of determining the degree of 
humiliation to which a captive person 
was to be subjected. (1975:37) 
This incident presents a stark and extreme illustration of the 
relationship between language and social allegiance, social power 
and social resistance. The link can range from this unsubtle 
instance to careful ideological engineering of discourse aimed at 
persuading a receiver to accept a certain view as valid and normal. 
This dissertation is based on the premise that people will often 
construct unequal power relations in society so that benefit may 
accrue to the more poweful. It requires violence and fear to create 
these unequal relations and they may be maintained by the same 
means. However stark violence is difficult to sustain; those less 
privileged would need to be persuaded that the inequality is 
legitimate or beyond their capacity to alter. For this to be 
accepted by the less powerful, for it to become part of their 
consciousness, the "message" has to be mediated in symbolic form, 
by ritual or by language. This study hopes to examine some aspects 
of how language mediates these ideological messages, and ways of 
diffusing the tensions and inequalities this language nexus creates 
and maintains. Though Language can be the means of subjugation, it 
can also be the route to an alternative consciousness that rejects 
unequal power relations as an unaltering condition of people. 
The introductory chapter one, which charts the background of the 
topic, will first consider the area of language and society, after 
which there will be a summary of the various processes in which 
language and power mesh, ways which are not the focus of this 
dissertation, but are important to consider as the extended field 
of the topic. 
2.The Focus of the Dissertation 
Chapter one will note a variety of ways in which social power and 
language are interrelated. The entire area of study is a wide one 
and outside the range of this dissertation. Therefore the general 
field will be covered by the first chapter. The study will then 
focus on the following aspects, which are the subjects of chapter 
two and three: 
*.The social effects of speech acts; that is their 
perlocutionary effects which have social significance. 
*.This will be linked to the manipulative aspect of discourse; 
for this critical discourse analysis will be evoked. 
Both these demonstrate power and ideology being mediated through 
language to produce social domination and to maintain inequality 
among persons and between groups. 
Inequality and social asymmetry are not the unquestionable 
conditions of people. Language can alter the consciousness because 
the spread of alternative principles is also effected by language. 
Through education and cooperation, by the spread of the practice 
and principles of democracy, a new consciouness can be forged that 
cherishes consensus and equality through dialogue. That will be the 
focus of the last chapter. 
CHAPTER ONE 
BACKGROUND 
There is a connection between language and the social structure 
which points to the link between the use of language and social 
power. Chapter one will consider this in a general sense, thus 
forming the background to the specific study of the same area 
within speech acts and discourse analysis which will be undertaken 
in chapters two and three. 
1. Language and Society. 
This section will discuss the relationship between language and 
social interaction, and the social construction of meaning. 
L I Language and Social Interaction; social purposes through 
language 
Social relations of power, domination or mutual respect are 
embedded in interaction between people, and this interaction finds 
its expression in language. Language reflects the live situation 
within the structure of social forces in which people take up 
positions in relation to each other. Unless we begin to view social 
interaction as a play of forces, we might tend to assume that 
there is a neutrality in interaction and there are no power 
relations presented in language, a view fostered by most schooling 
and socialization processes. But an analysis of the language will 
indicate power relations being created, accepted or contested, as 
Roger Fowler writes: 
In real communication people are doing 
more than transmitting neutral 
positions...Their language assumes 
structuration reflecting their personal 
purposes in communication. (1986:70) 
In communication people may wish to persuade, influence or have 
some effect on someone else, and these purposes and perlocutionary 
effects are expressed in the linguistic structure they employ. 
It may be comparatively easy to perceive a marked and obvious 
intent i f it is displayed overtly. I am arguing that all 
language has an intent. Even i f the style suggests an innocence or 
neutrality, most language including accounts and descriptions 
contain what Shapiro (1984:2) calls the "mythic level", that is, 
they have a social function, a worldview to promote, affirm or 
deny. It is in the linguistic structure that these purposes can be 
found, as Shapiro writes: 
Seemingly neutral accounts of 
activities deliver, by dint of their 
grammatical and rhetorical structures, 
implicit political arguments, either 
legitimations for entrenched authority 
or polemical critiques which seem to 
demystify or disestablish existing 
structures of power and domination. 
(1984:2) 
Even this dissertation has a plot or view it promotes, which is 
revealed by what is said and by virtue of how it is said, that is 
by its linguistic structure. Against the much promoted view of the 
neutrality of language and its objective existence, mediated 
through a focus on how effective a communication may be, this 
dissertation promotes the view that the social relations indicated 
by language are as important a consideration as the communication 
language may serve, or more to the point, the messages of the 
content can fully be realised only i f there is an awareness of the 
social interaction and power relation between the speaker/writer 
and the receiver. This is not to deny that there can be referential 
or descriptive accoimts of language, the stress here is on the 
social aspects and functions of language, especially its 
ideological purpose. 
This does not mean that every speaker or utterance has some devious 
intent; to believe in this "plot" theory would be to display 
paranoia or cynicism. The point is that there are positions being 
promoted, either consciously or unconsciously. In the latter case 
the language structure has already assumed certain relations to 
which we have become socialized; we inherit by our upbringing a 
world view which is not neutral and we inherit a loaded language. 
Shapiro expresses this: 
Argument is sedimented in 
language....The flow of statements and 
meanings in any discursive practice, 
even the most austere, descriptively 
orientated ones are part of 
historically engendered social 
practices which preceed any 
speaker/author and, in addition, guide 
interpretative practices deployed on 
texts once they are produced.( 1984:2) 
Expressions of sexism in language are often in this way unconscious, 
part of the inherited language that mirrors the social world. There 
are examples of sexist language used in this dissertation, such as 
quotations employing the male pronoun for all people; this is the 
language I have inherited. We acquiesce to the ideological 
implications of the language we have learned and are unconscious of 
its bias. However we are not trapped in this; a critical reading of 
our own language forces an awareness of the power relations and 
value laden nature of the language we ourselves deploy. This 
critical reading or change in awareness is the main focus of my 
last chapter which looks at social resistance through language. 
Under normal circumstances we come to accept not only the bias but 
also the norms our society has developed about speech. Hudson sums 
this thus: 
Society controls our speech in two 
ways. Firstly by providing a set of 
norms which we learn to follow 
..Secondly society provides us with the 
motivation for adhering to these norms. 
(1980:119). 
Our motivation for not questioning these norms and values is the 
desire to f i t into society, of being accepted as a member of the 
in-group or for our social security. In this we agree to the limits 
our social world imposes on our language and social behaviour. 
Foucault (1984:109) calls these "powers of exclusion", among which 
he lists "prohibition", which he defines as: 
We know quite well that we do not have 
the right to say everything, that we 
cannot speak of anything in any 
circumstances whatever, and that not 
everyone has the right to speak 
anything whatever. In the taboo on the 
subject of speech, and the ritual of 
the circumstances of speech, and the 
privileged or exclusive right of the 
speaking subject we have the play of 
three types of prohibition, 
(in Shapiro 1984:109) 
1.2. Language and the social construction of meaning 
J.Wilson wrote: 
Man alone is capable of controlling his 
environment and himself by means of 
language techniques. (1972:1) 
We order the world through our language; it categorizes and 
abstracts what otherwise would be inchoate. In this "construction" 
of the world, which is the meaning we and our language impose on 
our environment, not only do we assign significance to objects and 
persons, but we define ourselves in relation to them. It is in this 
relation to others that we construct social relations; and if this 
meaning is disseminated widely enough it permeates a society's 
consciousness to become our shared reality and agreed 
categorization pattern. We agree on these conventions. Roger 
Fowler has argued the role of language as the coding medium of our 
imposed world view: 
Language plays a major role in 
establishing the system of ideas or 
"theories" which we impose on the 
world...Language is the central part of 
the social process and is a highly 
efficient medium in the coding of 
social categorizations. (1986:18) 
However any linguistic form studied in isolation has no set 
categorization or specificic observable ideology; its significance 
or meaning emerges in the specific discourse. This argues for a 
study of language in use to discern an ideological structure, 
rather than considering isolated examples of language. That can be 
done for syntactic analysis of the formal sort, but not for the 
meanings being discussed here. Gunter Kress argues that ideology 
and discourse are aspects of the same phenomenon and so language 
has to be analysed for social functioning: 
It is because linguistic forms always 
appear in a text and in a systematic 
form as the sign of the system of 
meaning embodied in a specific 
discourse that we can attribute 
ideological significance to them. The 
defined and delimited set of statements 
that contribute to a discourse are 
themselves expressive of and organised 
8 
by a specific ideology, 
(in van Dijk 1985:30) 
The purposes of the communication and the social setting generate a 
characteristic meaning set which is coded in a specific structure 
of a text. To elicit or study this set the language cannot be 
separated from the social setting and then dissected for its 
significance; the interrelatedness of meaning and social setting is 
central to analysis. 
The social construction of meaning is not something that is often 
negotiated democratically in a society. Different sections of 
society are located in different and unequal positions and they 
have differing degrees of control over the meanings in the society. 
It is likely that those in more powerful positions, economically 
and politically, will be more in a position to influence the set of 
meanings. Fowler indicates the different meanings: 
Our semantic repetoire and the 
structure of our language are similar 
to the resources of people who have 
similar paths through life and 
significantly different from others. 
(1986:148) 
Much of this chapter will look at the procedures by which the 
powerful in society control the production of meaning, the 
procedures Foucault talks about: 
In every society the production of 
discourse is at once controlled, 
selected, organised and redistributed 
by a certain number of procedures whose 
role is to ward off its powers and 
dangers, to gain mastery over its 
chance events, 
(in Shapiro 1984:110) 
So we note that language is an artificially and consciously 
organised method of control by use of symbols and conventions in 
the first place, and an ideological structuring in the second place 
to give advantage to those in power in a society. 
This view of power domination in language and society of which even 
those in power are often unconscious suggests a rather 
deterministic view of society, a lack of agency or contestation. 
This would be a narrow reading of what has been discussed thus far; 
there is often a clash of ideologies in a society, a contest 
reflected in the struggle to control the language, which by its 
ambiguous nature allows arenas of challenge. To believe otherwise 
would be to be trapped in a narrow version of the "Sapir-Whorf 
hypothesis, a rigid social world insisting on a specifically 
constructed meaning system. Fowler has this to say about the 
challenge in the meaning system: 
A language embodies ways, not one way, 
of looking at the world, and in die 
circumstances it is obvious that 
speakers are not going to be trapped 
within one overriding system of 
beliefs. (1986:149) 
Nor is contest the only alternative to a dominant hegemony through 
language; it is possible for people to act out democracy, to engage 
in true dialogue on equal footing, and to be rational. As I have 
argued, to believe otherwise is be cynical and to have no 
affirmative sense of people. This study will demonstrate both the 
contest over meanings and power and the possibility of a resolution 
to that contest by learning democracy through language. 
2 Language and power 
This dissertation intends to study aspects of speech acts and 
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discourse analysis to show the ideological underpinning of language 
in use. The area of language and power is however larger than this 
narrowed study. To gain some idea of the wider study, for which 
there can be no space in a dissertation of this length, the other 
aspects of the relationship of language and power are summarised in 
the following sections. They constitute important background 
considerations to the main thrust being presented in this study, 
the ideological effects of speech acts and discourse. 
2.1 .Privileging a Language. 
A group in power, be they a majority or a minority, will often 
grant or insist on an official preference to their language in a 
multilingual society, or into a society into which they have 
penetrated and gained control. In the colonizing drive native 
languages were often devalued and they gained the status of being 
inferior, and as a result became neglected. In this way Irish was 
displaced by English, though in that country there is now a 
reversal and Irish is being promoted offically. But there the 
strength of English cannot now be diminished because it has become 
the native language of the majority and is the language of access. 
Besides the economic and cultural dependence of Ireland on England 
insists on the de facto promotion of English. 
Ngugi wa Thiongo (1988) related how under British rule in Kenya 
Gikuyu speaking children were punished for speaking their mother 
tongue. This was to promote English, and: 
The domination of a people's language 
by the language of the colonising 
nations was crucial to the domination 
of the mental universe of the 
colonised. (Ngugi 1986:16) 
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At present Afrikaans, the language of the white minority racist 
government in South Africa, is a compulsory official language in 
that country. The 1976 Soweto school student uprising against the 
state was triggered by the students' rejection of Afrikaans as the 
dominant medium of the school. South Africa, in common with many 
countries, has language selection as a central facet of its strife. 
The list of such instances is large and growing. Often they appear 
idiosyncratic, such as the casting out from Hindi of Urdu derived 
vocabulary after the partition of India in 1947, but they are 
related to social issues of power, national pride, rejection of 
foreigners, forced integration, control of the economy and a host 
of cultural issues. The point is that power in society can be 
created and maintained by privileging a language over another. This 
is also an area of intense contestation, when languages are often 
kept alivCy seemingly against all odds: 
I believe that my writing in Gikuyu, a 
Kenyan language, an Mrican language, 
is part of the anti-imperialist 
struggles of Kenyan and African people. 
(Ngugi 1986:28) 
2.2. Privileging a standard dialect and a pronunciation 
preference 
In countries where there is a range of dialects and regional 
pronunciation, that of the dominant group emerges as the standard 
form and is associated with prestige. Preference in society, for 
employment into better paid positions, often requires a command of 
the standard form because the other regional varieties are 
considered inferior and unschooled. In England television and radio 
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promote regional dialects and pronunciation to some extent, but 
status and education is still attached to those speaking the 
southern dialect of the middle-class with its "received" 
pronunciation. Economically prestigious jobs are likely to go to 
speakers of this form. 
Because English is now an international language there are new 
dialects native to the the colonised regions which have retained 
English as an official language. Here too, preference for better 
positions is likely to go to those speaking a form closer to 
standard English and the received pronunciation. One of the South 
African students on this M.A. course at Durham, who speaks English 
with a Black South African Accent, desires her children to acquire 
a received pronunciation, and for this purpose her children attend 
a White private school in South Africa. Regional dialects and 
accents may be seen to be "colourful" or interesting, but they do 
not gain the status of the standard form. 
Again this is a contested area. Scottish people retain a Scottish 
accent which is seldom seen as inferior to standard English. That 
is true only of the standard Edinborough accent; the working-class 
Glasgow accent would be far less socially prestigious. 
2.3. Specialised Rhetorical Styles. 
The specialised language of the in-group, that is the jargon and 
technical phraseology of a subject, position or field becomes a 
gate-keeping mechanism to bar those not familiar or initiated into 
this rarified style. This close-shop pattern can range from street 
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gangs to the argot of trade unions, but finds its most powerful 
form in academia. Academics who become steeped in a special style 
begin to use it as i f it were normal discourse, and in this way 
become inaccessible to the lay public or their students. Academic 
progress by students is often no more than cracking the code of the 
specialised area rather than any profundity. Pierre Bourdieu 
castigates the discourse of teachers, especially the "magisterial" 
discourse of university teachers: 
Of all the distancing techinques with 
which the institution equips its 
officers, magisterial discourse is the 
most effacious..(it) is able to appear 
as an intrinsic quality of the person. 
(1977:109) 
Bourdieu sees this not as superior or specialised knowledge, but as 
prestige safe-guarding manoeuvres: 
The ultimate protection of the 
traditional professor is the 
professorial use of a professorial 
language. (1977:110) 
This specialised language, uttered in a certain manner may impress 
those unfamiliar, but it also keeps at bay the rest of society, and 
the substance of the field of knowledge fails to communicate or be 
intelligible except to those literate in the nuances and the almost 
devious use of language: 
(This) language can ultimately cease to 
be an instrument of communication and 
serve instead as an instrument of 
incantation whose principle function is 
to attest and impose the pedagogic 
authority of communication and the 
context communicated. (Bourdieu 
1977:116) 
2.4. Schooling, Language and Inequality. 
Because society privileges standard dialects and pronunciation 
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which are generally the domain of the middle-class, schools try to 
foster these forms. But for children already socialised into 
working-class or regional dialects, the pronunciation pattern, 
dialect and attendant norms of school are an alienating experience; 
and children of the working-class or non-dominant culture are 
disadvantaged by the schooling process. It teaches them failure in 
society at an early age. Basil Bernstein (1972) has argued that not 
only is there a difference in dialect and pronunciation, but 
because language articulates experience, the experience of 
working-class children is different and their language code will be 
different from that of middle-class homes, less given to detailed 
descriptions and deploying greater intimacy and tacit 
understandings. Schools favour detailed verbalizing and 
explicitness, and this creates a cultural clash for the 
working-class child. Pierre Bourdieu sums up this alienating 
experience which ensures that working-class children and those from 
different cultures seldom succeed in schooling and therefore are 
prevented from economic and social advantage: 
There is a world of difference between 
the experience of school that is 
prepared for by a childhood spent in a 
family circle where words define the 
reality of the things, and the 
experience of unreality given to 
working-class chUdren by a scholastic 
acquisition of a language which tends 
to make unreal the things it speaks of 
because it makes up their whole 
reality: the "pure", "correct" - i.e 
corrected - language of the classroom 
is opposed to the language the 
teacher's marginal notes stigmatize as 
"vulgar" or "common". (1977:119). 
Related to the issue of schooling and language is the area of 
language and knowledge. Knowledge is constructed and transmitted by 
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a language. The dominant group in a society by controlling language 
can control knowledge or select that knowledge over which they have 
mastery and present it as prestigious knowledge. Thus lay knowledge 
and lay language are not valued as the specialised or selected 
knowledge and language. Geof Esland has this to say on this issue: 
Language exists both as subjectivity 
and as objectivity. As subjectivity it 
structures an individual's intentions 
and thought processess; as objectivity 
it preserves and makes public vast 
systems of knowledge in human 
societies. (1972:57) 
The knowledge mastered by the children of the dominant group, often 
book knowledge, is made "public" by language till it becomes high 
status knowledge and marginalises the knowledge of other groups who 
do not have the power or language monopoly to impose their own 
knowledge. 
2.5.Language, prejudice and stereotypes. 
In multicultural and multilingual communities there may be a 
wrestle over power or domination by one group. The domination and 
often rejection of other groups is marked linguistically by 
prejudiced discourse. This prejudice spreads among the in-group or 
the dominant group, as van Dijk writes: 
We view prejudice as a form or as a 
result of what we may call "social 
information process", not at a purely 
individual or personal level, but 
rather as a central property of social 
members of groups, on one hand, and of 
groups and intergroup relations on the 
other hand. (1984:3) 
We note that this prejudiced language serves communicative and 
social functions such as persuasion at the interpersonal level, 
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solidarity within a group, the dissemination of social beliefs and 
opinions within a group, and for the normalization of attitudes and 
social precepts for the behaviour towards other groups, often a 
group of another race or a minority group. This prejudiced 
language manifests itself as stereotypes, erroneous beliefs, 
clouded reasoning and biased perception regarding the other group: 
Due to the socially shared 
representation of outgroups in general, 
and ethnic minorities in particular, 
members of the ingroup will tend to 
perceive the appearance and the actions 
of minority members as inherently 
"different", mostly in the negative 
sense, (van Dijk.l984:17) 
This is how hostile or derogatory social images of non-dominant 
groups are spread through language, be it sexist, racist or other 
prejudiced discourse. 
2.6. Pragmatic Markers of Power and Solidarity. 
According to Hudson (1980:125) linguistic signalling of power and 
solidarity has been researched enough to produce the universal that 
every language might be expected to display some way of signalling 
differences in either power or solidarity or both. The key concept 
in these relations is of "face", a term from Ervine Goffman, that 
suggests a social status which can be maintained, lost or enhanced. 
An extreme example is the one Coultard (1985:31) quotes from Albert 
(1972) of the Burundi peasant farmer employing an "ungrammatical" 
utterance when addressing a social superior; the peasant makes a 
"rhetorical fool" (Albert) of himself to save her/his face. And 
Hudson notes that: 
In Japanese and Korean there is a 
fairly direct relation between power, 
solidarity and verb forms (1980:126) 
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Most languages will permit some such markers, some more pronounced 
than others. 
Brown and Levinson (1978) note that markers of solidarity and power 
are expressions of politeness, or strategies to prevent breakdown 
in communication and promote cooperation: 
Al l (people) choose means that will 
satisfy their ends Given that face 
consists of wants satisfiable only by 
the actions of others, it will in 
general be to the mutual interest of 
two people to maintain each other's 
face. (1978:59,60) 
What this overlooks is not cooperation but compulsory compliance or 
acquiescence to strategies which mark one as socially inferior and 
less powerful. Much of this kind of study in the field of 
ethnographic linguistics ignores social asymmetry or regards it as 
the normal social order; it ignores the implicit power relations 
which need a critical sense to bear on them. Brown and Levinson are 
interested in the presentation of self and cooperation in social 
interaction, rather than in social change or in any attempt to 
relate the social markers and strategies to a critical theory. 
Theirs is a descriptive/analytical ethnography with no critical 
edge, as found in Paul Willis (1977). 
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CHAPTER TWO 
ASPECTS OF THE SPEECH ACT THEORY WITH A FOCUS ON 
PERLOCUTIONARY EFFECTS, ESPECIALLY IDEOLOGICAL EFFECTS 
Geoffery Leech in describing his approach to linguistic pragmatics 
saw the study as answering this problem: 
Given that I want to bring about such-
and- such a result in the hearer's 
consciousness , what is the best way to 
accomplish this aim by using language? 
(1983:preface page x) 
Of interest to this study is the accomplishment of the ideological 
"result in the hearer's consciousness" and behaviour. For this 
purpose I shall be looking at the perlocutionary aspects of 
Austin's work. Leech denies that perlocutionary effects are a 
proper study possible under the area of pragmatics: 
Perlocutionary effects do not form part 
of the study of pragmatics, since 
pragmatic force has to do with goals 
rather than results. (1983:203) 
There is too close a causal link between goals and results for 
there not to be great influence exerted by one over the other. 
Students of linguistic pragmatics need to consider results as an 
integral part of the field. Besides Leech's distinction is glib and 
he falls into the academic trap of disassociation from the social 
implications of speech, which was an essential aspect of the early 
thrust of pragmatics and its rationale. The goal/result dichotomy 
severs the text from its context, and denies the continuity and 
intertwining of utterance, goal, result and utterance. 
The speech act theory formulated by J.L.Austin (1975) broke the 
monopoly of the "true/false" description of language; he showed 
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that an equally valid description of language was the action of an 
utterance, which he called "performative": 
It indicates that the issuing of an 
utterance is performing an action- it 
is not normally thought of as just 
saying something. (1975:6) 
I want to extend this concept of "performance" to include 
ideological performance; that is, the power-creating and 
maintaining function of language is part of what we perform when we 
produce language, it is what normal language does. Many of the 
speech acts such as naming are conventional and easily 
identifiable. Fowler adds to the conventional list, "requesting, 
denying, stating, commenting, informing, and so on" (1981:18). But 
he goes on to conclude: 
Every utterance performs a speech act 
of some sort, although this may not be 
obvious from the surface structure of 
the sentences concerned. (1981:18) 
The speech act may be dkect, that is hinging onto the literal 
meaning, or indirect, that is what is implied. Both may be used to 
convey ideological force and therefore there would be no point in 
pursuing what difference there may be between them because force or 
intent is what I am dealing with, not directness or indirectness. 
They both relate to a context: 
Statements are about something, they 
suggest something, and to understand 
them is to understand their relationship 
to what they are about, i.e. to the world 
outside the statement. (Mclellan 1986:69) 
To demonstrate the speech act theory let us take an example. 
Suppose person A says to person B in a warning whisper, "Keep away 
from that man, he smells unwashed," and because of this B does keep 
her/his distance from the man. A has said the words s/he uttered 
and by hearing this B has kept a wary distance from the man. A has 
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performed several different acts, according to Austin, 
1. A has said something 
2. A has said something to B 
3. B has as a result kept away from the 
man. 
Austin will call these three acts a locutionary act, an 
illocutionary act and a perlocutionary act respectively; ie the 
meaning of the words uttered, the intended force of the words and 
finally their effect on the receiver. 
There seems to be no fruitful purpose in distinguishing between 
locutionary acts and illocutionary acts because saying something is 
intending what is implied by the words. Searle argues this same 
conclusion: 
Austin tells us, performing a certain 
locutionary act; uttering a sentence 
with a certain force is part of the 
meaning, where the meaning uniquely 
determines a particular force, these 
are not two different acts but two 
different labels for the same act. 
(in Rosenberg and Travis 1971:263,4) 
The "meaning" referred to is interpreted as both literal and 
indirect meaning or implication. The concern with illocutionary and 
perlocutionary acts provides us with more information about 
communication. This study intends to view perlocutionary acts, 
which are the effects of our speech, and illocutionary intentions 
in producing the speech as being close, except when there is 
resistance to the purpose of the utterances. Illocutionary and 
perlocutionary acts coincide when the desired or 
structured-in-language effect is achieved by the utterance; the gap 
widens when between the intent and effect there is a difference: 
We must systematically be prepared to 
distinguish between "the act of doing 
x", i.e. acieving x, and "the act of 
attempting to do jc".(Austin 1975:105) 
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Some effects may be accidental or a desired effect may fail because 
of the participants' different degrees of competence in the 
language being used. Of greater interest is the critical awareness 
of the receiver when s/he resists the illocutionary intent when 
that fails to coincide with the receiver being considered as a 
democratic equal to the producer of the speech. So the ideological 
structuring of utterances is their illocutionary intent and 
perlocutionary effect, and for that reason the focus of this 
chapter will be on perlocutionary causes, which are really 
illocutionary forces, and perlocutionary effects. That is where 
ideological intent is achieved or resisted. 
Austin defined perlocutionary acts in this way: 
Saying something will often, or even 
normally, produce consequential effects 
upon the feelings, thoughts or actions 
of the audience and it may be 
done with the design, intention, or 
purpose of producing them 
We call the performance of an act of 
this kind the performance of a 
"perlocutionary" act. (1975:101). 
m Austin notes that illocutionary acts are related to effects 
three ways, "securing an uptake, taking effect, and inviting a 
response" (1975:118). By "uptake" he meant that the receiver must 
hear/recieve the words and take them in a certain sense; s/he needs 
to understand them. Understanding can be at different levels. The 
ideological content may be understood by the receiver i f s/he is 
critical of what is being said or consciously agrees with the 
position being promoted. However there may be an unconscious 
uptake, in the sense that the receiver accepts the ideological 
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underpinning as natural and not as an area for reflection. 
By "taking effect" I understand the utterance must register with 
the hearer who is then poised for the response. "Taking effect" can 
in a similar way be conscious or unconscious. The receiver may 
accept and agree with the ideological intent; may unconsciously 
agree with the position; may disagree but accept the position; may 
disagree and reject the position but still cooperate with the 
desired response; or contend the view being promoted and respond 
with an active rejection. So we note a closeness between "taking 
effect" and "inviting a response", and the response itself is the 
perlocutionary act. 
In chapter one and the preceding paragraph we noted that the 
ideological content is not something a speaker or receiver may be 
fully aware of. They inherit a language and world view. Austin is 
unaware of this unconscious intent of our language, but he 
acknowledges that effects can be unintentional: 
The perlocutionary act always includes 
some consequences, as when we say "by 
doing X I was doing y": we do bring in a 
greater or less stretch of "consequences" 
always, some of which may be 
"unintentional".(1975:107) 
The necessary condition for the performance of perlocutionary acts 
is the condition that the perlocutionary act is performed when an 
utterance produces an effect on the listener's thought, action or 
feeling. Steven Davis formulates it in this way: 
(i) the speaker's saying something, 
(ii) the occurrence of an effect on the 
feelings, thoughts or actions of 
the speaker's audience, 
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(iii) A causal connection between (i) 
and (ii) (Searle et al 1980:38) 
And to (ii) above we can add the ideological effect achieved or 
intended by (i). 
Davis also offers an improvement on Austin's three terms. We have 
seen that illocutionary acts cannot be separated from locutionary 
acts (Searle in Rosenberg and Travis 1971:263,4). Davis argues that 
illocutionary acts carmot be separated from perlocutionary aspects. 
Austin had formulated the distinction in this way: 
We must distinguish the illocutionary 
from the perlocutionary act: for 
example we must distinguish "in saying 
it I was warning him" from "by saying 
it I convinced him, or surprised him, 
or got him to stop".(1975:110) 
But in saying what was said the speaker intended the receiver to be 
convinced, surprised or to cease some action. Possible 
perlocutionary effects are already contained in the force of the 
utterance and as such the force is a perlocutionary cause. 
Unintended effects are also built into the words, but the speaker 
may not be conscious of them. Davis offers this terminology: 
(i) "speaker's saying something" 
designates a perlocutionary cause. 
(ii) "hearer's X-ing" designates a 
perlocutionary effect. 
(iii) "speaker's causing hearer to X" 
designates a perlocutionary act. 
(in Searle et al 1980:39) 
These suggest the perlocutionary features of what has been called 
illocutionary acts. 
The effects of saying something operate through the conventions of 
language: 
saying something produces effects on 
other persons, or causes things..(and 
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this) has to operate through the 
conventions of language and is a matter 
of influence exerted by one person on 
another.(Austin 1975:113 footnote) 
Conventions of language are accepted and often inherited 
agreements, which are accessible by gaining a competence in the 
language, a competence in the Hymesian rather than the Chomskyan 
sense. When a person knows how to speak and understand a language 
there is a range of knowledge or abilities s/he possesses, i.e. the 
person is competent in that language: 
A speaker knows the rules which govern 
the performance of illocutionary and 
perlocutionary acts. (Davis in Searle 
et al 1980:41) 
So for the effecting of a perlocutionary act the words uttered 
produce a response from the receiver because of her/his competence. 
I want to argue that this competence includes ideological 
competence. The producer of the speech uses her/his competence to 
say something, the receiver's competence is necessary for the 
production of an effect on her/him, which is already part of the 
response. For the utterance to produce a power relation or present 
a self-advancing world-view, the same competencies are required. 
This competence permits the ideological effects of the utterance 
which, i f it is to be done successfully, needs the cooperation of 
both the producer and receiver. The same or more critical 
competence is necessary i f there is to be a rebuttle of the 
ideological design of the utterance. This sharpening of 
competencies is the thrust of the educational principles of the 
language educationist Paulo Freire. 
Ideological competency and cooperation with ideology, like general 
acquaintance with the conventions of the language, are not 
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necessarily conscious or deliberate. Inherited ideological 
positions are patterned on a language and the user may accept these 
"messages" because of a longer-than-one-life agreement with the 
social relations implied in the language. For most people the power 
and privilege social patterns indicated in the language seem a 
normal aspect of the language they are using. In the last chapter 
the work of Paulo Freire will be studied for the insight it sheds 
on how a critical appraisal can be brought to bear on the language 
we use, whether that language is ideologically favouring our 
positions or not. 
The influencing of one person by another through speech is the act 
of producing perlocutionary effects. Much of language contains 
ideological positions being promoted and this is intended to be 
accepted by the receiver of the utterance. The ideological 
positions are promoted through perlocutionary causes and 
illocutionary force, and realised through perlocutionary effects. 
The receiver uses her/his competence in being affected by the 
intention of the utterance; the ideological purpose is effected by 
a conscious or unconscious collaboration with it. The producer may 
deliberately structure the utterance for this purpose, or use it 
knowingly or be unaware that s/he is employing it. The same 
producer, convinced of the need for consensus and democracy, may 
deliberately avoid structuring her/his language to gain social 
power or resist the ideological structure already inherent in the 
language, as will a critical receiver. We can alter the ideological 
underpinning of language and remove it altogether because neither 
ideology nor the language it is encoded in is deterministic to the 
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extent that we are helpless. 
The argument thus far has been that ideology is an intent in the 
language we use; it is a part of the speech act. Now we need to 
search through discourse to see how ideology is packaged in 
language and how it operates there: 
Sentences are used to perform speech 
acts such as stating, questioning, 
commanding, ..(etc). The speaker also 
communicates his attitudes towards the 
probability, desirability (etc) of the 
states of affairs mentioned in the 
propositions. Additionally, the 
utterance of a sentence contains 
indicators of the spatial, temporal, 
and interpersonal orientation of the 
contents. (Fowler 1986:68) 
Chapter three will show how this packaging occurs in discourse. 
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CHAPTER T H R E E 
DISCOURSE ANALYSIS TO UNPACK I D E O L O G I C A L CONTENT 
1. General 
In asymmetrical social relations within societies structured on 
social inequality power relations are often intended or expressed 
in communication. As we are socialised into that society we learn 
and most often acquiesce to the hierarchy and unequal spread of 
advantages, which aspects are also reflected in the language. To 
lay bare these aspects, to demystify them we can scrutinize the 
communication in which they are embedded. 
Roger Fowler and Gunter Kress write: 
The structure of a language should 
generally be seen as having been formed 
in response to the structure of the 
society that uses it. (in Fowler et al 
1979:188) 
And Halliday had suggested three major functions in language: the 
"ideational" which conveys the contents, i.e. the events and 
processes; the "interpersonal" which expresses the speaker's 
attitude to the propositions and the receiver; and the "textual" 
which is about the presentation of the first two in understandable 
texts. These three are inextricably intertwined; the interpersonal 
cannot be separated easily from the ideational; the ideological 
force would be in the domain of the interpersonal but spills over 
into the other two. From these Fowler and Kress conclude that: 
The selections which speakers make from 
the total inventory of forms and 
processes are principled and 
systematic; and the relation between 
form and content is not arbitrary or 
conventional, but that form signifies 
content, (in Fowler et al 1979:188) 
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And this brings us to the study of discourse in which social 
positions and intentions are packaged: 
Let us not, therefore, ask why certain 
people want to dominate, what they 
seek, what is their overall strategy. 
Let us ask, instead, how things work at 
the level of on-going subjugation. 
(Foucault in Lukes 1986:233) 
For this we need to engage in the ideological analysis of 
discourse. 
Kress and Hodge (1979), Fowler, Hodge, Kress and Trew (1979), and 
the fourth volume of Handbook of Discourse Analysis, subtitled 
Discourse Analysis in Society, edited by van Dijk (1985), to name 
some major works, have researched this field. Drawing on Marxist 
and conflict explanations of the relationship between economic and 
cultural lives, these analyses home in on the class and interest 
conflict, exploitation and power relations in society and language, 
which are seen as part of the cultural world underpinned by the 
economic and other divisions in society. Features of discourse are 
scrutinised for social indicators that show how power is being 
mediated through language, how the interest of the speaker or 
her/his group is represented in the details of the language, van 
Dijk sums this thus: 
Ideological analysis will often have a 
critical dimension in the sense that it 
intends to reveal underlying class 
conflicts, power relations, and 
ideologies through discourse analysis, 
(in van dijk 1985:8) 
van Dijk goes on to explain that this sort of analysis is used on 
public discourse such as the statements of politicians, news 
bulletins and advertisements. The technique may equally well be 
applied to interpersonal discourse because it is not only in the 
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language of propoganda or of big corporations that we see 
manipulative techniques being deployed; they are also packaged into 
what may appear to be non-controversial or innocent discourse. 
True, more spectacular results may be achieved by scrutinising 
political talk for it is more given to manipulative intent. 
The reason for this critical analysis of discourse is that the 
social meanings are not always apparent in the referential meanings 
of the statements, we need to interpret that which is implied. This 
is especially so because our literacy education and socialization 
have focused on referential meanings and not the social ones. That 
in itself is a method most societies employ to prevent their 
members from questioning the implied social relations in the 
language forged by the group in power. Power is maintained by 
keeping people in ignorance. It is therefore important for a 
critical discourse analysis which will demystify the social 
implications of utterances. 
It needs to be repeated at this stage that I am not advocating a 
"plot" theory in language that suggests that speakers deliberately 
and constantly aim at mystification, concealment and conspiracy. 
The selection of linguistic forms indicating power and inequality 
may not be deliberately chosen by a speaker; often people occupying 
official positions, by using the institutional language of their 
professional world, may be uttering implications contrary to their 
sympathy. School teachers are often caught in this predicament. The 
discourses they employ are already existing in the repertoire of 
their social positions, a repertoire they have inherited. This is 
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not an attempt to exonerate such users, just to offer an 
explanation of how some people may use a linguistic form without 
consciously choosing it and in this way reinforce the social 
asymmetry. The last chapter will indicate that linguistic education 
of a demystifying kind may grant such unconscious users of a 
linguistic repertoire an awareness of the social implications of 
their own language. There may, however, be many instances where the 
users of a linguistic form may opt for it deliberately because of 
the social advatage it promises them. Critical discourse analysis 
aims to show the ideological content of utterances, be that content 
the speaker's deliberate design or not. Fowler and Kress sum this 
idea in relation to language: 
Social structure provides the resources, 
individuals mediate their realization, 
(in Fowler et al 1979:196) 
2. Critical Discourse Analysis 
There is a central ambiguity in language and therefore no critical 
analysis method can be devised which will provide ready answers at 
the end of the process. We can impose no analytic grid in any 
mechanical way and expect results to flow. Nor is there a 
sequential stage-by-stage method which will reveal the unpacked 
truth at the end of the process. The point is that we cannot just 
sit in front of a text and run a programme through it to produce 
critical results, though quantifiable items may be noted for some 
social effect. Social meaning and linguistic form do not correlate 
in some unambiguously predictable manner. Individuals may choose 
deliberately to cast their utterance in some specific way which 
grants them or their interests some social advantage or the person 
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may be employing an inherited repertoire. For a critical analysis 
we need to consider the social location of the producer of the 
utterance and the social setting in which it is deployed, and then 
specific characteristics of her/his discourse which suggest the 
ideological commitment of the utterance, be it implied or direct. 
This needs a more qualitative rather than a quantitative approach. 
Because there is no ready packaged analysis programme for what we 
are seeking and because language is ambiguous we may be tempted to 
despair of gaining any aneilytic techniques. Language may be 
ambiguous, but it is not without structure. To scrutinize the 
structure we can follow the three assumptions presented by Fowler 
and Kress (in Fowler et al 1979:197), assumptions which can be used 
to guide critical discourse analysis: 
*The first of these is to accept Halliday's three functions of 
language, the "ideational", the "interpersonal", and the 
"textual". This means that the analyst has to relate linguistic 
forms and items to these three functions which are themselves 
interrelated. 
*The second assumption is that the linguistic forms are choices, 
deliberate or inherited. These are guided by the social purpose 
of the speaker or of the dominant group. A search for these will 
indicate some unity of purpose or some ideological positioning. 
This does not mean that there will always be this unity because 
language is both ambiguous and slippery and contradictions may 
appear. 
*The last assumption presented is that the syntax suggests 
meanings, including social meanings. These can be read off from 
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the utterance. 
Fowler and Kress (1979:198) offered an analysis checklist for the 
critical appraisal of a text to reveal its social signification. 
Their original five areas were: 1 the grammar of transitivity which 
indicated events and processes and their associated agencies; 2 the 
grammar of modality which marked the interpersonal relations 
between the interlocuters; 3 transformations which showed the 
linguistic manipulation of linguistic material; 4 the grammar of 
classification; and 5 the coherence or unity of the discourse. 
Since then Fowler (in van Dijk 1985:68-74) has reworked the 
checklist and offered the new one more tentatively as being 
informal and only a guide. The social investigation of discourse 
may consider the items on the list in collaboration with each other 
and with relation to the context of the utterance. The new list 
contains 1 Lexical processes, 2 transitivity, 3 syntax, 4 modality, 
5 speech acts, 6 implicature, 7 turn taking, 8 address, naming, and 
personal reference and 8 phonology. In discussing these I intend to 
follow closely the reworked list Fowler offers and introduce new 
material where necessary. 
2.LLexical Processes. 
The social interest of a person or group is reflected and expressed 
in the vocabulary of the individual or group. Fowler argues that 
concepts in the society are related to lexicalization. Concepts in 
greater currency and of advantage to the group or person will 
possess a wider range of synonyms. This would be 
overlexicalization, many words for one concept, such as "individual 
entrepreneurship", "merit", "endeavour", "pride in work" and the 
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range of similar expressions in the milieu of the conservative 
restoration, the period of Thatcherism. These indicate the 
prominence or promotion of a set of beliefs. In more restricted 
arenas we call the same proliferation of similar vocabulary items 
around a promoted concept "technical jargon" or the "slang" of the 
in-group. In South Africa the present racist regime slips into 
currency terms such as "evolutionary change", "negotiated 
settlement", "protection of group rights", and "cultural autonomy" 
to soften their facist image and retain racial segregation to 
their economic and social advatage. In writing of this I too am 
privileging some vocabulary choices such as "racist" and "facist" 
to promote my understanding of the ruling group in South Africa. 
Underlexicalization may occur when a system of related concepts is 
prevented from gaining social currency. Besides these there are 
groups of words in opposite categories and one set of categories is 
associated with power, learning and privilege. For example the 
category of abstract words is associated with privileged groups and 
advantaging schooling, and the concrete is viewed as rough and 
inferior. Examples of these would be abstract terms such as 
"predisposition" and "democracy," and the concrete such words as 
"spade" and "brick". Interestingly a word such as "democracy" is 
gaining currency with politically conscious youth in South Africa 
to the extent that it is a common word with them. General and 
specific are the next two categories, general terms suggesting a 
wider categorization ability, and specific seen as being tied to 
the particular and the narrow. Words borrowed from foreign 
languages often gather impressions of glamour, intellectual prowess 
or other advantage to them. Vocabulary choices may suggest complex 
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or simple morphology, such as "psychotherapy" and "red", the former 
suggesting association with learning and power and the second with 
things simple. So we note that the availabilty and use of certain 
vocabulary choices is allied to power and prestige in society. But 
we must note that these associations are not binding; they can 
slip, as I shall argue in chapter four. 
2.2. Transitivity. 
The study of transitivity and power looks at the actions and the 
participants of action in a clause. The predicates (i.e. the verbs, 
adverbs and adjectives) indicate processes, actions and states; and 
the roles are performed by the peuticipants (i.e. the nouns). The 
agents or participants can be assigned the ability of deliberate 
power or control as in "Mandela met P.W. Botha" which is markedly 
different from "Mandela was taken to meet P.W. Botha". The second 
confers an object state rather than an agent state to Mandela. The 
agent is seen as controlling the process and performance while the 
object or instrument is seen as undergoing the process. 
Transitivity indicates a fundamental difference in how people are 
presented and this relates to issues of who is deemed to be 
powerful. But reading this off a text is not simple, it needs a 
context. In the Mandela example the official South African 
statements, by using the first sentence which normally would 
indicate an agent status, now suggest that he is a free agent and 
thus diminish the fact of his continued imprisonment. Fowler makes 
distinction between agents and objects, and between instruments and 
experiencers. Instruments are used to effect actions as in 
"Negotiations will iron out the differences", and experiencers are 
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shown as experiencing mental states and processes as in "De Klerk 
listens to the grieviences of the Black people" and "The 
conservatives are jubilant". 
Fowler argues that the effects of transitivity are central to the 
linguistic construction of reality and contribute to the formation 
of relations and differentials of power. The first focus is on the 
roles assigned to participants by the predicates, and the second is 
on what types of entities are seen as being able to perform 
certain processes. Fowler's example is widely applicable; a state 
sympathising newspaper may implicitly blame those demanding reform 
and portray them as the agents of subversion and disruption and 
exonerate the excesses of the government and its police. A group in 
power may disclaim its responsibility by assigning agency to some 
abstract formulation as in "Conditions in South Africa insist on 
the continuing state of emergency". Fowler calls this the use of 
pseudoagents. So we note that transitivity and its attribution of 
agency is marked in the structure of clauses and a critical 
discourse analysis will indicate how power relations are being 
mediated through these structures in sentences. While we have been 
looking only at sentences the attribution of agency can be 
dispersed through an entire text and is often identifiable only by 
looking at the patterns in whole text. 
2.3.Syntax. 
Early transformational-generative grammar indicated that different 
syntactic choices expressed the same underlying meaning which was 
retrievable by discovering the deep structure of a sentence. I 
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agree with Fowler when he argues that the visible structure implies 
social meanings which cannot be found in a paraphrase which alters 
the essential meaning. This view insists that the social relations 
embedded in a sentence are part of its essential meaning. Let us 
take the example from the section on transitivity, "Conditions in 
South Africa insist on the continuation of the state of emergency". 
The pseudoagency of conditions mystifies the real agents. There has 
been a deliberate deletion of agents : insist has no object and 
continuation has no subject, and the sate of emergency is not 
linked to who is going to impose it and who will be affected by it. 
We could rephrase the statement "The government of South Africa 
finds that the conditions created by the resistance to apartheid 
forces it to reimpose a state of emergency", but a government such 
as South Africa has at present would prefer the nonspecific 
mystifying syntax. 
Fowler maps out three areas of syntax manipulation that indicate 
relations of power: deletion, sequencing and complexity: 
2.3.1. Deletion 
Normal speech contains many instances of truncations or ellipses 
which rely on the context for their interpretation. In modem 
English the more intimate the relationship the more likely the 
appearance of ellipses, and the more formal the situation the more 
complete the sentence details. But truncations are also related to 
other social values such as brusqueness (impatient truncations), 
emphasis (indicating power or deference) and shared knowledge (a 
shorthand for those in the know). 
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Two syntactic constructions that allow deletion and are of 
importance for the purpose of this study are (a) nominalization and 
(b) the passive. 
Nominalization is when the action of a verb is presented as a noun 
as in continuation in the example used before. Other examples are 
statements such as "Compliance with the law will guarantee 
security". Fowler argues that nominalizations are endemic to 
authoritarian discourse such as police bulletins, official 
statements and legal jargon. They are used to try to cow the lay 
public. The ideological results of nominalization are two fold: 
first they create new nouns which code experience in a specific 
social maimer and this encoding is then disseminated to become the 
general social reality by propoganda, the media and by education. 
The new terms are presented as given and no longer innovations or 
new constructions being foisted upon a public consciousness. The 
second consequence of nominalization is that it removes agency and 
modality and this makes distant and mysterious the real agents, 
their actions and motives. It mystifies their responsibility and 
culpability. In the example quoted above (Conditions in South 
Africa insist on the continuation of the state of emergency) the 
action or agency of the South African government is disguised and 
their motives mystified. 
The Passive allows agent-deletion and this permits the omission of 
the reason or cause of an action, as in "Steve Biko was found dead 
in prison" or "David Webster was killed outside his house". In both 
these cases the state or agent responsible is exonerated by 
omission. Both passives and nominalizations practice the "ideology 
38 
of impersonality" (Fowler 1985:71) which mystifies the power behind 
the action. This sort of language use is spread in a community by 
the agents of the state, the school and the media till it is given 
a status of being superior and objective. 
2.3.2. Sequencing 
This is a prominence granting mechanism in a sentence. The passive 
may be used to grant this as in "Webster was killed by the state" 
as opposed to "The state killed Webster". The order in which the 
information is released to the addressee is intended to focus 
her/his attention differentiy and suggest agency differentiy. 
Different topicalizations may be used for prominence marking, as in 
"Insubordination we will not tolerate". The slightiy unusual 
sequencing is used to express the power base of the uttering 
"authority". Other reorderings could include the use of 
parenthetical phrases. These deliberate sequencing of words for 
social effect are rhetorical devices to manipulate the focus of the 
receiver. 
2.3.3. Complexity 
Basil Bernstein (1972) offered his controversial theory of a code 
difference between working-class speech and that of the schooled 
middle-class. While the implication of his formulation is now in 
doubt, what can be salvaged is that experience is coded 
differentiy. Speech associated with power and prestige contains 
greater explicitness, a wider vocabulary of standard dictionary 
synonyms and a higher ratio of subordinate clauses indicating more 
explicit causal relations. The opposite forms that rely on shared 
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assumptions and greater use of coordinating sentences is associated 
with being socially naive. Children mastering the socially 
prestigious forms gain an advantage in school and in society. 
2.4.Modality. 
The speaker's attitude to her/his proposition and to the addressee 
can be encoded in the modality of the sentence, in words such as 
"must" and "will" and so on. According to Fowler the devices of 
modality fall into certain categories: 
*Validity: this is when the speaker expresses her/his confidence 
or lack of it in the truth of the statement, as in "It 
may have been there". 
* Predictability: This indicates the speaker's degree of sureness 
about some future event included in her/his statement, as in "It 
is likely to be over by then". 
*Desirability and Obligation:: This indicates the speaker's 
judgement about some obligation by her/himself or more often by 
someone else. Expressions of "ought" and censure are included 
here. 
*Permission: This is when the speaker allows someone else to 
perform some action, as in "You may do so now". 
Modality is expressed in linguistic form by 1 modal auxiliary verbs 
such as "may, shall, must and need", 2 sentence adverbs such as 
"probably, certainly and regrettably", 3 adjectives such as 
"certain, unfortunate, necessary" and 4 verbs and nominalizations 
such as "permit, predict, prove, desirability, and authority". 
There is also what Fowler calls the modality of deference signalled 
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by words or phrases indicating subservience, deference, 
underconfidence, acquiescence and reliance. Expressions such as " I 
was wondering." and "Doesn't it" indicate deference. Such 
expressions can be tag-ons and therefore regarded as of modals. 
These are closely related to the issue of power and solidarity 
discussed in chapter one. 
2.5.Speech Acts and Implicature. 
By implicature is meant indirect or implied meanings, and is 
contained in the illocutionary act. This and speech acts have been 
covered in chapter two. 
2.6.Tum Taking, Naming, Address, and Personal Reference. 
The section on power and solidarity in chapter one dealt with these 
issues. 
3. How Deterministic Is The Ideological Force Of Language ? 
Graddol et al (1987:205-208) accuse the critical discourse analysis 
underpinning of being deterministic: 
An important point to note about this 
kind of analysis is that the theory 
underlying it is explicitiy 
deterministic: it suggests that the 
language used in a culture affects the 
way people perceive and interpret 
events. (207) 
Apart from evoking the Whorf hypothesis no more argument to support 
this claim is presented. True, language can determine consciousness 
especially when it is acquired and internalised in an unquestioning 
way, which is the manner most schooling fosters; or the linguistic 
consft-uction of the world may agree with one's world view and 
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interests. But the theorists advocating critical discourse analysis 
do not claim that there cannot be resistance to this. The act of 
critical linguistic analysis is itself a powerfully persuasive 
argument that language structuration can be resisted and a critical 
attitude fostered. 
Graddol et al also express their discomfort at the overt political 
position admitted by the proposers of critical discourse analysis, 
and at the same time grant that there can be no value free research 
or position (1987:208) They argue for degrees of objectivity, their 
own position being presented as being more objective than that of 
Fowler and the other theorists who agree with him. This desire to 
retain "academic" objectivity and yet admit the relative nature of 
positions is itself a political position increasingly allied with 
conservative thinking which fosters the ideology of separating 
academic debate from action on social issues. And this ideological 
position of Graddol et al is presented in the language they 
use. 
Critical discourse analysis has not attempted some "objective" or 
"scientific" correlation between social relations and language, a 
study that may be presented in quantifiable results of tables and 
statistics. It offers a fact of social organization which calls for 
enquiry and action. To conclude I would like to review the seven 
points of recapitulation offered by Kress and Fowler (1979:194) 
1. I agree that forms of social organization influence 
linguistic structure and linguistic use. By that I mean both 
the structure and use that acquiesce to the dominant ideology 
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and that which is a resuh of oppositional attitudes in a 
society. 
2. The elaboration of the first point undermines the original 
point two presented: This influence operates in a deterministic 
fashion: social structure x demands linguistic variety y. We 
can improve on this by adding that structure x may be satisfied 
by variety / , or for opposition variety z may be used to 
undermine structure x. Between the 1979 formulations and 
Fowler's writing in 1985 this new perception has been noted. 
3. I accept that the linguistic influence and choices made by 
people may not be deliberate or may be difficult to resist. 
4. I agree that social structure is indicated in all aspects of 
language and not merely in the easily identifiable references 
to interpersonal relations. 
5. Different forms of language are not just stylistic varieties 
of each other, but encode different social concepts and 
ideologies, and the availability of those concepts is 
controlled by the language being used. 
6. Social inequality and power relations are prominent 
influences of linguistic structure. This is central to this 
dissertation. 
7. The point is offered: Language not only encodes power 
differences but is also instrumental in enforcing them. To 
which can be added that language can be a powerful agent for 
resisting those power differences and for expressing 
alternative social values. That will be the thrust of the next 
chapter. 
43 
CHAPTER FOUR 
LANGUAGE AS MEANS TO AN ALTERNATIVE CONSCIOUSNESS; 
FREEDOM AND CONSENSUS 
One of the most persistent attacks on attempts to relate language 
to social control is the accusation that this is a deterministic 
line of thought. I am arguing that while language is a potent 
weapon of social control, it harbours a persistent ambiguity that 
permits challenge to that social process, a counter control, and 
the possibility of general demystification which promises 
egalitarian values and open rational communication. This is no mere 
theoretical position; the struggle to free language from oppressive 
control is recognised as a liberatory tool in freedom movements in 
places like South Africa and in the social assertion of 
marginalized communities in Britain. In South Africa 
transformative social change is being sought by democratic 
organizations who have formulated principles for what is termed 
"People's English", which is language for shared social power. 
People's English intends all learners to: 
-understand the evils of apartheid and to 
think in non-racial, non-sexist and 
non-elitist ways 
-play a creative role in the achievement of 
a non-racial democratic South Africa 
-use English effectively for their own 
purposes 
-express and consider the issues and 
questions of their time 
-transform themselves into full and active 
members of society 
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(National Education Crisis Committee press 
release 27 November 1986, quoted by Gardner 
1987:45) 
The education implication of the language theories of Paulo Freire 
which will be discussed in the last section of this chapter has the 
same force as these aims of People's English. 
People are not only the objects of language and its social 
mechanism; they can also become its subjects, reforming language 
and its social implications to serve non-oppressive social 
functions. To present this argument I intend to discuss these 
aspects: 
1. The central ambiguity of language 
2. Communication for true consensus 
3. Language and liberation 
h The Ambiguity of Language: an area for contest. 
Utterances are acts of power because they act on people; either by 
giving them information and so altering their perceptions in some 
way, or by defining them and in this way modifying the ways in 
which they are seen by other people or by themselves. Engaging in 
communication is altering someone's world. These acts of power may 
be unilateral in the sense that the will or utterance of only one 
person may be the altering tool, or they may be a collaboration of 
wills, even i f this collaboration is forced. The third alternative 
is that the power in an utterance may be resisted by an alternative 
utterance or encoding of view. This brings us to the contest 
possible over the power inherent in verbalizations. Language is an 
alternative to sheer force because we do not have the continual 
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ability to enforce violence; we use language to shape the same end 
at far less cost and psychological impairment to us. But a symbolic 
system, such as language, cannot be a naked and inflexible sword 
because it is difficult or impossible to construct verbal 
statements which cannot be refuted or distorted. Language is 
powerful but it is also an imperfect oppressive tool because it 
permits answering and opposition. 
This "imperfection" in the power enforcing mechanism of language is 
its ambiguity. A useful piece of work arguing this ambiguity of 
language and its uses is "Verbalizing a Political Act: Towards a 
Politics of Speech" by J.G.A. Pocock in Shapiro (1984). Pocock 
writes about the malleability of language: 
There is a certain refraction and 
recalcitrance in the medium which 
ensures that the language which I bend 
to perform my own acts can be bent back 
in the performance of another's act 
against me, without ceasing to be 
available for my counter-replication, 
(in Shapiro 1984 :31) 
So while language grants its user power, that user may try but 
cannot fully control the ambiguities of language, nor can s/he 
prevent others from sharing that power of language. Though, through 
the control of education, the mass-media and other apparatuses, 
some may try to prevent others from gaining a foothold on the power 
of language. Essentially in using language the user enters the 
inevitable recognition of other people's power or potential power, 
a compromise that Pocock calls entering "a polity of shared power" 
(1984:31). 
One of the reasons for this central ambiguity of language is that 
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it is not the product of one will , but the inheritance of many acts 
of power. Language consists of many institutionalized structures 
formed over time by people no longer known and for exercises of 
power and intentions no longer remembered. So the words that 
perform a person's acts are not hers/his alone, but inherited by 
that person. Besides they are institutionalized in form and defy 
reduction to the speech act of only one person. Pocock argues that 
language structures which have been institutionalised are available 
for use to more than one person, and serving more than one purpose 
in one situation: 
They (the words) are never free from 
the ambiguity in the sense that they 
can never be reduced to the performance 
of any one person's intentions. (in 
Shapiro 1984:31) 
A person has to borrow, inherit or take from another's words to 
enact her/his speech act, and the person at the receiving end is in 
a similar position. The institutionalized nature of language allows 
the person to or about whom the words are spoken the potential to 
answer in similar terms. Of course not everyone has the same 
ability to use the ambiguities language affords them. This is an 
aspect not recognized by Pocock who assumes all are free or able to 
perceive and use the ambiguities of language. The wrestie to gain 
mastery or recognition in the terrain of language struggle has to 
be conscious or learned. That is what Paulo Freire argues, as I 
will discuss later. 
Pocock writes about our language inheritance: 
Each of us speaks with many voices, 
like the tribal shaman in whom the 
ancestor ghosts are talking at once; 
when we speak, we are not sure who is 
talking or what is being said, and our 
acts of power in communication are not 
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wholly our own. (in Shapiro 1984:29) 
This quotation must not be read as a mystification of ideological 
intent in language; we can be sure of the social location and 
affiliation of a speaker, and the ideological intentions of her/his 
speech act. The point being made here is, I think, that we do not 
create language anew each time we use it; it reaches us in an 
institutionalized form, or as Pocock says: 
Very complex processes of assumption, 
mediation, and conventionalization have 
gone on to bring this language as a 
structure of givens. (in Shapiro 
1984:29) 
However we do not use the given language passively; we seek to 
impose our worlds onto others by means of symbolic communication, 
which is an act of power. The seeking through language rather than 
the guarantee of power suggests there are what Pocock (ibid:33) 
calls "frictions in the medium". Our intentions are mediated 
through language and we have no choice but to accept the 
uncertainties and institutionalized nature of the medium which 
others will also utilise. We have to recognize that other 
intelligences operate in the communication process and we cannot 
exclude the power they may bring to the mediation. 
So we conclude that language is not wholly manageable to the extent 
that it is completely within our control; it is difficult to 
monopolize. We may impose our biases, but others can also impart 
their own opposing biases. This results in a contest of strategies 
of language control or we can drop all strategies and be rational 
and respecting of each other, which stage Pocock after Habermas 
calls true communication. What neither of them spells out is that 
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it is necessary for an education or change of heart for people to 
come to this last realization; it is not an inevitable resolution. 
Democracy and equality in communication have to be worked at i f the 
ambiguities of language are to be exploited for these values. 
The ambiguity of language allows for a "deconstruction" of ideology 
and fixed meanings, a task undertaken in literamre by critics such 
as Edward Said and Michel Foucault. Said sees "textuality" or 
critical reading as confronting ideology in language. Ideology 
assumes a secure hierarchy of meanings, but according to Eagleton: 
Textuality exposes those fissures, 
slippages and self-mutilations that are 
inevitable to ideological discourse as 
to any other (in Said 1980:149) 
Shapiro (1984:221) in paying homage to Foucault writes of 
Foucault's pedagogy which teaches us to "read" power off a text. We 
begin to understand that in reading a text we can discover how 
power is packed into the discourse, and when we write how we encode 
ideology. However we need not inscribe this ideology or power into 
our languge, we can offer alternative discourses which 
"deconstruct" the ideological positions around us. Thus we gain an 
insight into: 
How power resides in the production of 
discursive entities that become 
fetishized and parade around us as 
literal descriptions. (Shapiro 
1984:222) 
Ambiguity in language sets the scene for the possibility of 
counter-oppression or for a resolution to the power-imposing game. 
In the next section I will discuss thinking around how rationality 
may achieve the latter result. 
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2.Communication for True Consensus: The Universal Pragmatics 
of Habermas. 
In this section I will be reviewing the thinking about language of 
Jurgen Habermas who believes there is an essential rationality in 
people and language that is disposed towards non-oppressive 
agreement and dialogue, which he calls "communication". This term 
is not a loose synonym for language but a precise definition 
distinguishing from ideologically structured language which is not 
regarded as communication. Habermas's writing is a very large body 
and difficult for me to read. So I have restricted myself to a 
selection of his work, "Hannah Arendt's Communicative Concept of 
Power" in Lukes (1986) and "A Reply to my Critics" in Thompson and 
Held (1982), and on the article "Universal Pragmatics" by Thompson 
in Thompson and Held (1982) and T.Bottomore's book, "The Frankfurt 
School" (1984). 
The dominant school of linguistics was that of formal linguistics 
inspired by Chomsky. This concentrates on syntax and "linguistic 
competence". Habermas noted the need to locate this competence in 
social settings of communication: 
In order to participate in normal 
discourse, the speaker must have - in 
addition to his linguistic competence 
-basic qualifications of speech and of 
symbolic interaction (role-behaviour) 
at his disposal, which we may call 
communicative competence, (quoted by 
Thompson 1982:119) 
In his use of the term "communicative competence" Habermas is close 
to the concept and term as used by Dell Hymes who paid homage to 
Habermas (Hymes 1985:18). For them a study of language must be 
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extended beyond any ability to produce well-formed sentences to 
language in use, or speech acts. 
For Habermas there are two starting points to his theory of 
language. Firstly he follows Austin and Searle in holding that 
saying something is doing something. The speech act becomes a basic 
aspect of speech and its forms need to be analysed and categorised. 
However he goes further to posit his second premise which is that 
there can be a fundamental rationality underpinning a speech act. 
This is revealed when the mystifying and distorting influence of 
ideology is removed by the desire for real human communication. 
This is idealistic, but Habermas has an affirmative sense of people 
and a belief in social change towards non-oppressive forms of 
society and communication. 
This idealism is embedded in a critical theory of social change. 
Language analysis must share this critical edge with critical 
philosophy and social sciences, i f it is to be a valid study of 
social phenomena. Cultural habits and social relations are 
institutionalized in language, as is ideology. Language is related 
to social processes which are outside linguistics. So a critique of 
ideology needs to scrutinize manipulative language which Habermas 
sees as containing distortions of power. Habermas notes that 
language is: 
Also a medium of domination and social 
force, (quoted by Thompson 1982:117) 
The unmasking of ideolgy and power differentials in language is a 
liberatory action in Habermas's thought, and close to the thinking 
of Freire. 
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One of the major distinctions Habermas draws is between violence on 
one hand and communication and consensus on the other. Language for 
him always carries the potential for the latter which is not the 
cessation of the use of power but its constructive social 
deployment. This is his concept of "universal pragmatics". In 
commenting on Hanna Arendt's evocation of fascism he wrote: 
Every political order that isolates its 
citizens from one another through 
mistrust, and cuts off public exchange 
of opinions degenerates to a rule based 
on violence. It destroys the 
communicative structures in which alone 
power can originate, (in Lukes 1986:80) 
The central rationality in people and language compels a 
"co-operative readiness to arrive at an understanding" (quoted by 
Thompson:! 19), and : 
Those involved (in communication) are 
orientated to reaching agreement and 
not primarily to their respective 
individual successes. (in Lukes 
1986:77) 
This is not to deny that there is no attempt in our society to 
distort and manipulate through language, which Habermas accepts is 
the case. However for him there is a reconstructive possibility in 
language: 
The strength of a consensus brought 
about in an unconstrained communication 
is not measured against any success but 
against the claim to rational validity 
that is immanent in speech, (in Lukes 
1986:77) 
My difficulty with this, as with Pocock's assumption that anybody 
can exploit the ambiguities of language, is that rationality and 
the ability to use the uncertainties of language have to be 
uncovered through dialogue and education. Those at the oppressed 
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end of symbolic violence have to become conscious of this for them 
to use it. This pedagogic aspects is not developed by either 
writer, partly because they assume people's freedom to follow these 
lines. This is an underestimation of the symbolic oppression 
prevalent in many societies that prevents access to an 
understanding of the possibilities of language. Paulo Freire is 
more specific about how language consciousness can be developed for 
liberation. 
Thompson (1982:125) sums up the four areas that Habermas 
established for communication 
1. that any speech act raises certain validity claims 
2. that communicative competence implies ability to deploy 
certain pragmatic universals 
3. that the ideal speech situation is presupposed on everyday 
speech 
4. there is a rationality possible in any discourse. 
These principles are meant to ensure the emergence of rationality 
and the discarding of ideology. I shall go through these, but my 
earlier criticism that these features have to be uncovered 
deliberately for social change still holds. 
l.The first principle of the validity claims is that when true 
communication is to be maintained, what is said has to be 
intelligible, its prepositional content true, the performative 
component correct ( that is, aspects such as the way in which 
something is said), and lastly the intentions expressed need to be 
sincere. The maintenence of these four ensures consensus. This is 
the ideal situation which "competent speakers must reciprocally 
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maintain with each of their speech acts" (Habermas quoted by 
Thompson 1982:121). 
2. The pragmatic universal Habermas suggests is the ability to use 
grammatically well-formed sentences as speech acts which are 
themselves rational. 
3. This rationality is not for Habermas a rare phenomena, but 
possible in the desire to understand and be understood in everyday 
speech. 
4. Claims to truth and correctness can only be proved, according to 
Habermas, through dialogue which is rationally motivated towards 
consensus. 
These four points bring us to an assessment of the roles of the 
actors or participants in a communication, and by implication their 
roles in society. First Habermas suggests that a primary role in 
interaction is the "orientation towards reaching understanding": 
I use the term communicative action for 
that form of social interaction in 
which the plans of action of different 
actors are co-ordinated through 
exchange of communicative acts, that 
is, through the use of language 
orientated towards reaching 
understanding. (Habermas in Thompson 
1982:234) 
This supposes that the potential consent of all the people involved 
would be freely given; an attempt towards rational consensus. This 
ideal speech situation should be characterised by an effective 
equality of chances for all the participants to assume dialogue 
roles. By that is meant the symmetrical chance to begin and 
continue discussions, to present arguments and to question, and to 
offer interpretations without preconceptions. 
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Habermas is not naive to believe that this ideal situation is the 
present case; for him, it is the social goal to be worked for by 
continual discussion or verbal praxis. Only by this transformation 
of society can the ideal be realised: 
Only in an emancipated society, whose 
members' autonomy and responsibility 
have been realised, would communication 
have developed into the 
non-authoritarian and universally 
practised dialogue. (Habermas quoted by 
Mclellan 1986:79) 
In our present society there are barriers to this ideal being 
realised. Next we shall turn to the work of Paulo Freire who offers 
an education for liberation based on language, an education 
intended to break those barriers. 
3.Language and Liberation: The Pedagogy of Paulo Freire 
Habermas implied that through consensus and respect for the other 
in dialogue a new social order could be forged. The writer and 
educationist who spelt out a methodology for this goal is the 
Brazilian Paulo Freire who worked with the dispossessed and 
illiterate people of the developing world where oppression is most 
rife. He showed how a people cowed into submission are not only 
materially dispossessed but barred from the power and control over 
language. This symbolic dispossession could be confronted by 
learning to reflect through and on language, and this was the 
beginning of questioning the social relations which perpetuated the 
unequal sharing of resourses. Freire ties his language awareness 
programme with an explicit action theory or praxis which is 
revolutionary. Some may argue that this is outside the 
consideration of linguistics, but I want to point out that the area 
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of linguistics being explored in this dissertation is bound 
inextricably with questions of wider social significance and 
action. One cannot shy away from the implications of learning how 
to confront injustice through language; it leads inevitably to 
social action. 
Freire's practical concern was initially with adult literacy 
education. He found the illiterate people cowed into a "culture of 
silence" which suggests a helplessness with control over 
verbalization and attendant reflection. There seemed no point in 
offering a traditional education which would keep such people 
marginalized (see the section on language and education; chapter 
one). Against this Freire posited a methodology (see his book 
Cultural Action For Freedom 1972) which encouraged reflection on 
one's position in society and one's relation with the world. People 
had to discover their subjectivity, their creative potential, and 
this could be achieved by focusing on language and literacy: 
I f learning to read and write is to 
constitute an act of knowing, the 
learners must assume from the beginning 
the role of creative subjects. It is 
not a matter of memorizing and 
repeating given syllables, words and 
phrases, but rather of reflecting 
critically on the process of reading 
and writing itself, and on the profound 
significance of language. (Freire 
1972:29) 
By organizing key vocabulary around a community's interests and by 
treating the learners as equals in the democratic education 
setting, more than literacy was learned by those participating. 
They began the "difficult apprenticeship in naming the word" 
(Freire 1972:28), which is Freire's sense of how the world can be 
transformed. People began to verbalize their relations with each 
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other and the social and economic world they occupied. For Friere 
acquiring critical language means gaining an insight into the 
relationships in the world and thereafter acting on that new 
knowledge. The next rather lengthy quotation sums up Freire's 
thought and gives some idea of the flavour and fervour of his 
wntmg: 
Learning to read and write ought to be 
an opportunity for men to know what 
speaking the word really means: a human 
act implying reflection and action. As 
such it is a primordial human right and 
not the privilege of a few. Speaking 
the word is not a true act i f it is not 
at the same time associated with the 
right of self-expression, of creating 
and re-creating, of deciding and 
choosing and ultimately participating 
in society's historical process. 
(1972:30) 
An interesting featiu-e of the language-naming theory of Freire is 
that there is no static resolution, the world cannot be named 
ultimately. That would suggest a future point where language comes 
to rest in equitable social relations and is no longer an arena for 
contest or creation. Freire sees our language and consciousness 
education as perpetually posing new problems ("problematization" in 
the vocabulary associated with Freire): 
To exist, humanly, is to name the 
world, to change it. Once named, the 
world in its turn reappears to the 
namers as a problem and requires of 
them a new naming. (Freire 1979:76) 
Traditional schooling and education imposed an unequal social 
relationship between the teacher and learners, which becomes 
institutionalized in the authority hierarchy in society. Freire 
caricaturized this teaching as depositing the teacher's language 
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and knowledge into the passive learner. In his adult literacy 
classes Freire developed new relationships in the group, based on 
the practice of democracy. The teacher or co-ordinator enters into 
a dialogue with her/his learners and together they explore the 
language. It is essentially respecting each other and entering a 
communication, as that term was used by Habermas. Freire calls this 
a dialogical realtionship. It presumes a reciprocosity in the 
relations and a non-aggressive attitude or negotiation: 
Dialogue is the encounter between men, 
mediated by the world, in order to name 
the world. Hence, dialogue cannot occur 
between those who want to name the 
world and those who deny other men the 
right to speak their word. (Freire 
1979:76) 
To conclude this section, it can be noted that both Habermas and 
Freire granted us philosophical and methodological insights of how 
the ideology present in the language used in unequal social 
relations can be resisted. Both offered the vision of a future 
ideal society in which manipulation would diminish and human values 
would be asserted. For both of them this is no rosy dream, but a 
future to be striven for and dynamic in its concept, sustained by 
continuous dialogue and power thrusts towards equality. Language 
may be highly oppressive, but we are not bound to suffer that 
without resisting and offering an alternative vision. 
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CONCLUSION 
The area of language, ideology and social context is not as clear 
cut as the field of formal linguistics, nor free from controversy 
and ambiguity. Examination of social interaction and cultural 
values insists that language cannot be separated from social 
conduct; and that is an area for interpretation and contest. 
In this dissertation I admit that I have considered a limited focus 
from the field of language and social relations or even language 
and power. I have tried to show that ideology resides in speech 
acts and it is packaged in ordinary discourse. An examination of 
the illocutionary force and expected perlocutionary effects directs 
one towards uncovering this ideological intent. An examination of 
discourse can unpack and demystify ideological bias. Both these 
assist in critical reading which is an act of resisting the 
maintenance of inequality through ideological manipulation of 
language. 
In the last chapter this resistance was located in how people can 
utilize the constant ambiguity of language. Resistance and critical 
thinking can lead to a more equitable social world; that is the 
rational outcome of the use of language for communication rather 
than domination. Language is, however, only one aspect in the drive 
to liberate people; it can raise consciousness and debate. To 
assume more would be naive: 
The whole concentration on language and 
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communicative competence seems to 
neglect material domination and class 
interest: access to unfettered 
communication may not be enough to 
secure an emancipated society if access 
to wealth and status are not similarly 
equalized. (Mclellan 1986:79) 
This reservation is not offered to undermine the gist of the 
dissertation, but is presented to acknowledge that consciousness 
through and of language has a limited emancipatory ability. 
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